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Mediators insist that they can be neutral intervenors when assisting par-
ties reach a negotiated settlement. They view their role as that of facilitating
the development of settlement terms that the parties find acceptable, irrespec-
tive of whether the mediator approves of them or if they are in the best inter-
ests of either the parties or the public.'
Some critics assert that it is not possible for an intervenor to be neutral.2
They contend that any individual, including someone serving as a mediator,
has personal goals, reputations, and motives that interact with the competing
concerns of the parties. All of these factors must be resolved in a way that is
satisfactory to everyone.8 Thus, the mediator has a decided interest in how the
dispute is resolved.
Other critics argue that mediators of such public policy disputes as the
siting of toxic waste disposal facilities or the allocation of block grant monies
have a duty not to be neutral.' These critics urge that rather than permitting
the parties' preference to dictate the outcome the mediator has an affirmative
duty to insure that the settlement outcome protects the interests of all those
persons not officially represented in the negotiating session and that constitutes
the optimum possible arrangement for each party.5
This debate has important practical implications in the development and
*Associate Professor, Baruch College/City University of New York. B.A.,
Kalamozoo College; J.D., New York University School of Law; M.A., Ph.D, University
of Rochester. Member of New York Bar.
1. A representative statement of such a viewpoint is stated in Newman, Medi-
ation and Fact-Finding, PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS-COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB-
LIC EMPOLYMENT 201 (1979).
2. Susskind and Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector, 27 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 255 (1983); Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Ac-
countability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981); Bernard, Folger, Weingarten, Zumeta,
The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas In Divorce Mediation, 4 MEDIATION QUAR-
TERLY 61 (1984).
3. P. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTRUAL PERSPEC-
TIVE (1979).
4. Susskind and Ozawa, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 63. For a related discussion, see H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
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expansion of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs. For example,
the Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program of New York State ad-
ministers 60,000 cases annually.' Recently, the Office of Court Administration
(OCA) promulgated guidelines for these centers that define a mediator's duty
when, during the course of a mediation session, one party alleges that the
other has committed acts of spousal or child abuse. The regulations require
the mediator to assess quickly the credibility of such accusations. If the accu-
sations appear to be plausible, the mediator is to stop the hearing immediately,
publicly assert that "domestic violence is not a negotiable issue," admonish the
accused party to cease such conduct, and offer available support assistance to
the victim.7 Divorce mediators debate what their duty is when servicing a
6. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 847 (codified as amended at N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW §
170.55(4) (McKinney 1982) (adding N.Y. JUD. LAW. §§ 849-a to -g (McKinney Supp.
1983-1984) (entitled Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program). See THE COM-
MUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT (1984).
7. The guidelines for domestic violence cases were adopted on January 1, 1984
and those for child abuse cases on August 14, 1984. The guidelines are set out below:
GUIDELINES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS REGARDING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
The Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program serves as a re-
source for the citizens and the justice system in the State of New York. We
recognize the danger that a program contracting with the Unified Court Sys-
tem to provide dispute resolution services may be inappropriately used as a
substitute for prosecution in domestic violence cases. It is not the intent of
dispute resolution centers to inhibit or limit an individual's access to any legal
remedy or protection.
The following guidelines have been developed by the dispute resolution
centers to assist in identifying domestic violence and in taking appropriate
actions in these cases.
GUIDELINE I. The Dispute Resolution Center staff must be trained in
the issues regarding domestic violence. Service programs for domestic violence
victims and batterers must be identified and methods for referring complain-
ants and respondents must be developed. The programs shall work with the
local prosecutor's office, law enforcement and the courts to assist appropriate
case flow, enforcement and victim protection in domestic violence cases.
GUIDELINE II. Domestic violence is not a negotiable issue.
GUIDELINE III. All domestic cases involving actually or potentially vi-
olent or imminently dangerous situations shall be referred to court or the ap-
propriate agency for proper action.
GUIDELINE IV. It is the obligation of the dispute resolution centers to
inform domestic violence complainants and respondents of their available op-
tions. In domestic violence cases in which the complainant expresses interest
in the mediation alternative, it is the obligation of the community dispute
resolution center to inform the complainant that mediation is remedial and
nonpunitive and that mediation cannot provide legal protection against future
violence.
GUIDELINE V. If both parties, having been informed by the dispute
[Vol. 1985
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resolution center staff of all available options, still voluntarily choose to re-
quest services from the center, the center may provide assistance to both par-
ties with services designed to inform, protect, educate, and support the indi-
viduals but in no way excuse the violent behavior.
GUIDELINE VI. In providing any services to domestic violence cases
the following precautions should be taken:
1. Staff should speak to each party individually to obtain as much infor-
mation about the circumstances as possible.
2. Staff should make every effort to obtain all legal protections available
for the victim.
3. Any staff person providing services to domestic violence cases must be
trained in issues regarding domestic violence.
4. Staff should never encourage a domestic violence victim to withdraw
or request dismissal of pending criminal charges or to not pursue criminal,
civil or social service remedies.
5. It is the obligation of the dispute resolution centers to conduct follow
up services with any case in which domestic violence has been identified to
assure the protection of the victim and the availability of legal and social
service resources.
GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CEN-
TERS REGARDING CHILD ABUSE.
GUIDELINE I. It is the policy of the Community Dispute Resolutions
Centers Program that child abuse is not a proper subject for the mediation
process. All parties to a mediation shall be advised that evidence of child
abuse, whether or not relevant to the issues involved, is inadmissible therein
for any purpose, and that if such evidence is adduced, it shall not be deemed a
confidential communication under the Judiciary Law.
GUIDELINE II. For the prupose of these guidelines, the term, "child
abuse" shall mean an act or failure to act by a parent or other person legally
responsible for a child which, as to such child: (i) inflicts or allows to be
inflicted upon him or her physical injury by other than accidental means
which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted
disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or (ii) cre-
ates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to him or her
by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or seri-
ous or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emo-
tiaonl health or protrated loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
organ, or (iii) commits, or allows to be committed, a sex offense against him
or her, or allows him or her to engage in a sexual performance.
GUIDELINE III. Each dispute resolution center (hereinafter "center")
shall, during its intake process, exercise maximum care and effort to deter-
mine whether a matter for which mediation is sought involves alleged or ac-
tual child abuse. Upon any such determination, a center shall advise the par-
ties that the matter may not be mediated. At the same time, the parties shall
be informed of any resources made available by the community to victims and
perpetrators of child abuse. If, based on the information learned at intake, a
center reasonably believes that a child's health or physical well-being is in
1985]
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couple with disproportionate bargaining skills and resources. 8 Mediators of
employment discrimination claims experience a similar dilemma as they hear
parties seriously entertain a proposed settlement that is less advantageous to
the complaining party than he would have secured in a traditional agency pro-
ceeding.9 Non-unionized organizations are developing ADR programs to re-
solve employee grievances ranging from employment discrimination claims to
routine office grievances; 10 universities utilize ombudsperson procedures to re-
solve intra-organizational concerns. 1 Participants in labor-managment rela-
tions are experimenting with new models for conducting discussions during the
term of the contract and intervenors assist them in developing such labor-
managment committees.' 2 Finally, the National Institute for Dispute Resolu-
tion is underwriting experiments in which governmental employees offer medi-
jeopardy, it shall also refer the matter to the statewide central register of
child abuse and maltreatment or to a local child protective service.
GUIDELINE IV. If the mediation process has begun and evidence of
actual or alleged child abuse is adduced, the mediator shall (i) stop the medi-
ation process; (ii) consult with each party individually, for the purpose of ob-
taining as much information about the circumstances as is possible; and (iii)
after consultation with such other persons as his or her center may require,
determine whether to resume the mediation process. In determining whether
to resume the mediation process, the mediator shall consider the progress
achieved by the parties before the process was stopped, the extent to which
the evidence of child abuse relates to the matter being mediated and the ex-
tent to which disclosure of actual or possible child abuse by one of the parties
to the mediation has affected his or her ability to conduct the mediation pro-
cess in an impartial fashion. Whether or not the process is resumed, the medi-
ator shall take such steps as are described in Guideline III herein.
GUIDELINE V. To promote the purposes of these guidelines, and to
facilitate compliance therewith, staff of each center shall receive instruction
concerning the issues relating to child abuse. To this end, service programs for
child abuse victims must be identified in each community and procedures de-
veloped for referral of complainants and respondents. Each center shall work
closely with local prosecutorial authorities, law enforcement personnel and the
courts to assure victim protection, proper case disposition and effective en-
forcement in child abuse matters.
8. Haynes, Matching Readiness and Willingness To the Mediator's Strate-
gies, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 79 (1985).
9. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION MEDIATION PILOT PROJECT, EDUCATIONAL
FUND FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1984) (prepared for the First National Conference on
Resolving EEO Disputes Without Litigation).
10. id.
11. Id.
12. LEONE, THE OPERATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES (1982);
Hoyer, Relations By Objectives: An Experimental Program of Management-Union
Conflict Resolution (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan 1982);
Newman, supra, note 1, at 200.
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ation services to resolve selected public policy disputes. 13 In each instance, the
intervenor's obligation and duties must be addressed and answered.
Each of these ADR program efforts resemble one another in their com-
mitment to promoting consensual decision-making by the parties to the contro-
versy and each state that the intervenor's task is to facilitate such consensual
decision-making. The family resemblence stops there, for some prohibit any
agreements inconsistent with institutional policies; 14 some only allow agree-
ments that establish substantive terms which harm no one and maximize all
possible mutual gains.15 Some prohibit the parties from reaching a consensual
decision on certain subjects. 6 Other ADR efforts assert with vigor that the
parties' preferences are to be decisive. 17
To assess whether the intervenor's role and responsibilities in these vary-
ing contexts should be comparable, and whether any of them can be neutral in
the manner advocated by mediators, one must compare these various ADR
programs in terms of their program goals, jurisdictional range, and the rules,
principles, and criteria that are deemed relevant to resolving the controversies
they address. Only then can one offer an appropriate conceptualization of an
intervenor's obligations and responsibilities of office. Section I identifies the
three basic questions that all ADR programs must answer and outlines the
nature of an appropriate answer to each one. These answers provide the
framework for designing any ADR procedure. Section II describes and com-
pares three different ADR program paradigms. These models feature consen-
sual decision-making as the primary dispute resolution procedure and provide
for third-party intervention to facilitate that process. Section III describes the
three different intervenor postures that attach to their respective ADR pro-
gram paradigm. This highlights the decidedly different roles and obligations of
the intervenor and puts into relief the appropriate manner in which the ques-
tion of a mediator's neutrality can be constructively addressed.
II. THE DEFINING QUESTIONS
Consensus decision-making incorporates the notion that controversies are
resolved only upon the acceptance and ratification of the proposed accord by
all participating parties.' 8 It contrasts most sharply with those procedures in
which some individual or body has the authority to impose a binding decision
to resolve the controversy. I shall use the term "negotiation" to describe the
13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM 6 (June 1984).
14. The Non-Union Complaint System at MIT: An Upward-Feedback, Media-
tion Model, EDUCATIONAL FUND FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1984).
15. Suskind & Ozawa, supra note 2.
16. Prohibited subjects of bargaining in federal sector labor-management rela-
tions, for example, are set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (1982).
17. See supra note 6.
18. For a related discussion of this concept in an organizational setting, see
VROOM AND YETTON, LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING (1973).
19851
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tactics and strategies that various advocates use to develop consensus. 9 This
does not assume that negotiation requires full disclosure of pertinent data,
honest representation of acceptable outcomes, or the like.20 Rather, the term
describes a procedure in which two or more parties identify issues of concern
and propose solutions. The negotiation process is distinctive because every
party has a veto over the outcome. 1
In designing any ADR program, one must choose a primary dispute reso-
lution procedure, establish its jurisdictional range, and define the participants'
roles. When incorporating negotiation as the primary dispute resolution pro-
cess, ADR designers must ask three defining questions:
1. Does the use of negotiation as the primary dispute settlement method-
ology for solving some or all disputes promote any social or institutional goals?
2. What types of jurisdictional exemptions, if any, should attach to the
use of the negotiation procedure?
3. What types of tasks and responsibilities attach to the various partici-
pants in the process and the auxiliary roles that are designed to facilitate the
negotiated settlement?
If the answer to Question 1 is negative, then the remaining questions do
not arise. If the answer is affirmative, then the answer to Question 2 cannot be
so extensive as to render meaningless the range of disputes which can be re-
solved by negotiation.2 2 The answers to Question 3 define the participant roles
for both the primary procedure and the procedures that are designed to help
the negotiators reach a successful outcome.
Answering the first question requires one to argue that using the negotia-
tion process to resolve some or all controversies promotes the overall general
welfare. This is a straightforward consequentialist argument: if using negotia-
tion promotes goals or objectives that we desire, then, other things being equal,
we should be prepared to endorse its use." The National Labor Relations
19. This term has gained popular application through such works as H. COHEN,
You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING (1980) and R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES
(1981).
20. For a discussion of the impact of truthful disclosure on negotiation settle-
ments, see H. RAIFFA, supra, note 5, at 51-65; the advantages of engaging in strategic
misrepresentations of material fact are also examined at 142-45.
21. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1982) states: "[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representatives of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hour, and other terms and conditions of
employment ... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession . ... "
22. One cannot consistently assert that using the negotiation process to resolve
some problems promotes desirable social benefits but then insist that no problem should
be eligible for resolution by negotiation.
23. This structure of normative argument is examined in Dworkin, Hard Cases
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Act,24 for instance, endorses the use of collective bargaining by employers and
unions to resolve their disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment25 because of the belief that collective bargaining will
promote a reduction in industrial strife.2 6 At this level, other dispute settle-
ment procedures such as legislation, arbitration, or force, compete with negoti-
ation. The basis we use to select one procedure rather than another embody
two different types of criteria. One type of criteria includes such utilitarian
elements as the efficiency of the process, the durability of the result, and the
precedent established (both procedurally and substantively) for resolving fu-
ture controversies of a similar nature. The other criteria are more aptly la-
beled ideal-utilitarian;2 7 they identify those features of a society that we wish
to sustain or develop. This category includes such goals and principles as in-
creased participation in the process by those affected by the outcome, enhanc-
ing personal dignity by requiring those affected by the outcome to assume pri-
mary responsibility for resolving their concerns, and the preservation of the
most extensive liberty possible for managing and resolving a broad range of
matters affecting us. Proponents of the negotiation process suggest that its use
promotes those goals more satisfactorily than other available procedures.
Scattered empirical data and anecdotal information suggests that consen-
sus decision-making advances some or all of these consequentialist goals.
2 8
ADR programs report that parties comply with negotiated agreements for a
sustained period of time,2 1 interpersonal relationships are not polarized,3 0 and
those affected by the outcome assume major roles in designing solutions to
their concerns.3 1 There are substantial conceptual difficulties involved in com-
paring these results of negotiation with the goals promoted by using other dis-
pute resolution procedures.3 2 Certainly, however, at an unrefined, macro level
there is no disagreement that legislating certain solutions or litigating certain
matters is more cumbersome than encouraging negotiated settlements and that
ignoring a problem can generate costs that negotiating might avoid or mini-
mize. Cumulative evidence that the negotiation process promotes these goals
in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977) and Wasserstrom, Preferential Treatment in
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES 51-54 (1980).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982); see also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
27. For a related discussion of this theory, see R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE
GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979).
28. NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST: FINAL EVALUATION RE-
PORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1980); BRINDENBACK, THE CITIZEN DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS IN FLORIDA: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT (1980).
29. NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST, supra note 28, at 104.
30. Id. at 89.
31. id.
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at least as effectively as any other dispute resolution procedure counts in favor
of answering the question in the affirmative.
Answering the second question forces ADR program designers to identify
the constraints which should be imposed on the dispute resolution procedure
adopted by the answer to the first question. Program designers must state or
acknowledge the matters for which the negotiation process shall or shall not be
the primary process for establishing primary rights and duties. There are three
types of jurisdictional exemptions: substantive public policy constraints; ad-
ministrative constraints; and constraints tied to the participant skills required
in the dispute resolution procedure.
There may be strong public policy reasons for not using the negotiating
process to resolve certain substantive disputes. For example, in dealing with
persons who engage in acts of violence, the public wants to affirm that such
acts are prohibited and that severe sanctions, including the loss of one's lib-
erty, attach to such conduct. Permitting identifiable killers to negotiate with
the family of the deceased victim to reach mutually acceptable settlement
terms rather than forcing the killer to face a public trial and its attendant
penalties violates that strong public policy. Although national policy encour-
ages an employer and union to resolve certain issues relating to work rules via
collective bargaining, Congress has restricted the range of mandatory bargain-
ing subjects.3 3 Employers are not required to negotiate such matters as prod-
uct development and discontinuance or plant closings.3 4 Even if such decisions
result in severe consequences to the work force, the justification for such an
exemption is that persons should enjoy the liberty to engage in entrepreneurial
enterprises. The risks of gain or loss attached to such decisions justify permit-
ting the owners and investors to make such decisions independent of the people
who will be significantly affected by their implementation.
There are administrative reasons for constraining the subject matter for
which the negotiation process serves as the primary dispute resolution proce-
dure. Some areas of conduct operate more efficiently and consistently if they
are directed or governed by rules, as contrasted with those established pursu-
ant to the preferences of the individual participants. For example, rights of
heirs, which are established by a complex web of statutory and judicial guide-
lines, fall into this category. If Testator A bequeathed his entire estate to his
son, B, who was already wealthy, to the exclusion of his other son, C, a pau-
per, one could argue forcefully that the practice of writing wills should be
displaced by a procedure in which an official simply calculates the size of the
decedent's estate, identifies all persons who could reasonably be expected to
benefit from it, and thereafter invites them to meet to negotiate an allocation
formula acceptable to each of them. However, the present procedure, among
other things, promotes laudable goals such as predictability, efficiency, and
33. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining By the NLRB, 63
HARv. L. REv. 389, 427 (1950).
34. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
[Vol. 1985
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consistency 385 that override those goals promoted by the negotiation process.
The final category for exempting certain types of disputes from the nego-
tiating process relates to the profile of the participants, not the subject matter.
This exemption occurs when one or more of the participants is powerless be-
cause he lacks the ability or resources to negotiate in a manner distinguishable
from simple, systematic capitulation to another's demands. In this context,
some persons oppose the use of mediated negotiations to resolve marital
problems in which one spouse is believed to be a victim of physical abuse.3 1
This is because the victim may be so traumatized by her partner that she will
agree to whatever settlement terms he proposes simply to appease him and
purchase some time free of physical strife. According to this argument, it is a
sham to claim that there is a mutuality of agreement under such circum-
stances. The generalized principle is that no person or group without a degree
of power to control their destiny vis-A-vis their negotiating counterpart should
resolve problems by negotiating; otherwise, sheer power dictates the results.37
This concern permeates the development of ADR programs addressing
problems involving parents and children,3 8 teachers and students,3 9 and institu-
tional officials and their wards."'
All of the controversial issues relating to the use of the negotiation pro-
cess reside in the debates surrounding the answer to this second question.
These debates are complex because individuals must identify the answers to
each of the three defining questions in order to weigh the competing strengths
and weaknesses of every dispute resolution procedure that is posed as an alter-
native to negotiation. The need to make such decisions in the practical world is
urgent. A governor must decide whether to negotiate with prisoners who hold
prison administrators and guards as hostages.4 A company must decide how
35. For a related discussion, see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION
(1961).
36. UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1982). See Lerman, Stopping
Domestic Violence: A Guide For Mediators, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION (ABA 1982)
37. For a related discussion of principled negotiation, see R. FISHER & W. URY,
supra note 19, at 6.
38. BLOCK, MEDIATION AN ALTERNATIVE FOR PINS (A RESEARCH REPORT
OF THE CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY'S PINS MEDIATION PROJECT) 12-17 (1982).
39. See the proposal for development of the mediation project commenced in
July, 1983 at the William Cullen Bryant High School in the City of New York which
is administered by the Metropolitan Assistance Corporation (Victim Services Agency)
and funded in part by the New York City Youth Bureau. This project is described in
Davis & Porter, Mediation in American Schools, 1985 Mo. J. Dispute Resolution
40. J. KEATING, IMPROVED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1976).
41. For a discussion of the prisoner uprising at the Attica Correctional facility,
see T. WICKER, A TIME TO DIE (1975).
1985]
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to handle citizens who are picketing its nuclear power plant.4 2 If one spouse
proposes to negotiate the terms of a divorce settlement independent of the ad-
versarial litigation context, the other must respond. 3 A mayor must choose
how to deal with citizen groups who are protesting the closing of a neighbor-
hood fire station by conducting a sit-in at their cherished firehouse.
The answers in such cases are not clear; they are legitimately debatable.
What is not controversial, however, is that such judgments significantly influ-
ence the integrity and manner in which the actual negotiation of those items
that remain subject to the process proceed. For instance, state and school offi-
cials establish the curriculum requirements for high school graduation;" they
are not subject to negotiation with students. However, school officials might
establish a mediation program to handle disciplinary charges involving stu-
dents.' 5 The program would encourage students accused of harassing or an-
noying each other in class to resolve their problem via mediated negotiations,
but the students could not agree to resolve their problem by having one stu-
dent drop a required course for that would violate the standards established by
other procedures. Some court-diversion programs for first-offender youths state
that the accused and victim can establish terms of restitution via mediated
negotiations.46 What is not subject to negotiation is whether the youth is re-
sponsible for the damage or the amount due;'7 what they negotiate is the form
of payment.
The range and type of disputes to which the negotiation process attaches
affects the degree to which it promotes the goals that led to its adoption in the
first place. Placing too severe a set of restrictions on matters eligible for nego-
tiation leads to the process being simply a shell for rubber-stamping a conclu-
sion reached in some other forum.
When ADR designers have identified both those goals promoted by using
negotiation as the primary dispute resolution procedure and the jurisdiction to
which it will apply, then one can elucidate the rights and obligations of the
various participants to the process. One way to examine the remaining ques-
tion is to analyze those ADR program paradigms that result from the sche-
matic answers given to the preceding questions.
42. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14. 1977, A22, col. 1.
43. R. COULSON, FIGHTING FAIR (1983); Haynes, Matching Readiness and
Willingness to the Mediator's Strategies, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 79 (1985).
44. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (McKinney 1981) (establishes studying
U.S. government as a curriculum requirement).
45. See supra note 39.
46. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND Di-
VERSION: PRETRIAL DIVERSION (1978); PROC. OF THE NAT'L SYMP. ON PRETRIAL SER-
VICES (1980).
47. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DI-
VERSION supra note 46.
[Vol. 1985
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III. ADR PROGRAM PARADIGMS
ADR program designers who promote consensual decision-making as the
primary dispute resolution procedure also define its jurisdictional reach. In so
doing, they simultaneously establish the relevant criteria for decision-making
that bind the negotiators. Three distinct ADR paradigms emerge, each distin-
guishable on the basis of the discretion accorded to the negotiators to strike
agreements they find acceptable.
A. Institutional ADR
An institutional ADR program permits negotiators to resolve the defined
range of issues in a manner acceptable to them as long as the resolution does
not conflict with other institutional goals and policies. Indeed, one party could
insist to the point of impasse to exempt certain solutions from consideration on
the ground that it would violate some institutional regulation.
For example, efforts to promote ADR procedures in non-union employ-
ment settings operate on the premise that the decision reached by the partici-
pants must be in accord with that institution's policies and practices;' 8 a super-
visor cannot resolve his disagreement with a contentious subordinate by
agreeing to give him a pay adjustment that is inconsistent with the company's
policies governing the timing of raises or level of compensation. Presumably, it
violates a university's policy if a male professor resolved a dispute with a fe-
male student regarding her charges of sexual harassment by agreeing to pro-
vide the student in advance with a copy of the final exam in exchange for her
commitment not to press charges. 9 Student mediators promoting consensus
among students charged with disciplinary infractions could not routinely en-
courage resolutions in which one student agreed to transfer to another high
school.6 0 In each of these instances, the policy makers for the institution con-
ceive of the institution as having goals, values, and practices that trump the
negotiated outcomes that individual members of the organization might other-
wise find acceptable.
B. Legal ADR
In this paradigm, parties can reach whatever conclusion they find agreea-
ble as long as it is consistent with those legal rights that the parties could
vindicate in a courtroom.
There is a sliding scale of ADR approaches in this category. Some ADR
programs, such as divorce mediation projects 51 or the mini-trial, 1 narrowly
48. See supra note 14.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 39.
51. J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1981); R. COULSON, supra note 43.
52. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, P. SZANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA:
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steer settlement discussions toward only those solutions that parties would
most likely have obtained in a courtroom proceeding. This conservative ap-
proach is designed to reassure participants that they are no worse off for nego-
tiating the agreement than they would have been had they proceeded with
litigation. In spirit, this posture is more akin to the institutional ADR model
than need be the case for the legal ADR paradigm.
Community dispute resolution, which involves court-referral or neighbor-
hood based programs for problems among neighbors, landlords and tenants,
merchants and consumers, exemplify a less restrictive form of this paradigm.""
As is true for any lawsuit, parties in these situations enjoy extensive latitude in
deciding whether to press their legal demands or accept settlement terms that
may be less favorable than the optimistic outcome of a successful lawsuit, but
which are more attractive because they promote other interests and needs. As
long as the settlement terms themselves are not illegal, the parties are free to
establish priorities according to their own preferences. What is true of these
matters, however, is that some party always has the alternative of trying to
obtain relief by initiating a lawsuit.
The least restrictive form of this paradigm are those instances in which
the negotiating parties cannot achieve their objectives by initiating a lawsuit
or insist that a matter submitted to negotiation be resolved in a particular
way. When unions and management meet to negotiate wages, they must reach
an agreement or leave the matter twisting in impasse; the law does not pre-
scribe specific criteria that the parties must consider in reaching an accord.54
In Connecticut, negotiators representing state and local government agencies
and non-profit service providers had complete legal freedom to establish pro-
gram priorities and budget allocations for the distribution of $33.1 million of
Social Service Block Grant monies.5 5 What remains true of these efforts, how-
ever, is that any party to the discussion can assert a legal right not to discuss a
particular issue and the subsequent discussions would be shaped accordingly.
In the above-cited examples, management could resist negotiating any non-
mandatory subject of bargaining, 6 and state officials in Connecticut could
PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION 34 (1984).
53. See ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY (L. Ray ed. 1983).
54. Standards that are appropriate to the resolution of collective bargaining ses-
sions, though not binding, are identified in such statutes that prescribe what interest
arbitrators must take into account when determining terms and conditions of employ-
ment. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SEV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney 1983).
55. A NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY: A JOINT AGREEMENT ON PRINCI-
PLES, PRIORITIES, ALLOCATIONS AND PLANS FOR THE SOCIAL SERVICES BLOCK GRANT,
OCTOBER 1 1983-SEPTEMBER 30, 1984 (December 22, 1982).
56. Douds v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957); NLRB
v. Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local 2256, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp, 356 U.S. 342 (suggesting management cannot
insist on negotiating non-mandatory subjects); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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have resisted any proposal to spend the Social Service Block Grant monies on
establishing a public school teacher continuing certification program.
5 7
This paradigm posits a scheme of legal rights and duties as the pivotal
points around which people negotiate. Parties are free to waive their claims so
long as the ultimate terms of agreement do not violate the law. Imaginative
negotiators in many contexts refrain from describing all problems in terms of
legal rights and obligations and invite their counterparts to identify basic
needs and concerns in a way that permits a broad range of possible solution. 8
While participants in these situations operate within or around the legal guide-
lines, they do not try to change them within the negotiating context. Although
this model is eminently serviceable in a broad range of controversies, it is inad-
equate for resolving those more explosive disputes that erupt without being so
nicely packaged.
C. Social ADR
In these programs, negotiators have the discretion to resolve the matter in
whatever manner they find acceptable. This does not mean that they ignore
the legal ramifications of their decisions, but rather, they treat such factors as
one more element to address in reaching a satisfactory resolution.
For example, when citizen groups in Minnesota protested the utility com-
panies' construction of a high voltage transmission line,59 part of the contro-
versy centered on the perceived inadequacy of the statutorily defined formula
for awarding easement compensation and on the administrative agency deci-
sion that established the corridor within which the line had to travel." The
parties did not feel constrained from negotiating a substantive agreement
whose provisions altered these legal requirements, for they agreed to the addi-
tional element of working cooperatively to change the law." One quickly dis-
cerns that social ADR efforts incorporate a frequent form of social behav-
ior-advocating and securing change through discussion, persuasion, and
action-into a structured form. Indeed, in this sense, negotiation is the central,
non-violent change-making procedure of a democratic society.
Institutional policies and rules guided the negotiators' options in the first
paradigm, and legal rules and principles regulated the participants in the sec-
ond paradigm. What principles guide the negotiators in the social ADR
model? 6" There are numerous candidates, but none is always applicable or
57. See supra note 55, at 36.
58. STULBERG, The Legacy of our Adversarial System in A STUDY oF BARRI-
ERS TO THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984).
59. REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1978).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Compare this discussion with Ronald Dworkin's analysis of the concept of
discretion in Dworkin, The Model of Rules in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977).
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dominant. They include the wisdom of the agreement, its durability, its feasi-
bility, its legality, the extent and nature of its impact on those not participat-
ing in the negotiations, its political acceptability to the negotiators' constitu-
ents, its impact on the negotiator's self-interest, and the precedent it
establishes. There are other criteria as well; not all are mutually exclusive nor
equally compelling. More importantly, negotiating counterparts can use differ-
ent criteria to justify their acceptance of proposed settlement terms. 83 In this
paradigm, there are no specific principles or guidelines that serve to trump
specific settlement terms and the individual negotiators do not need to use the
same guidelines when contemplating whether to accept the proposed settle-
ment terms. Systematic efforts that come within this social ADR paradigm
include those projects that experiment with using mediated negotiations to re-
solve race riots,6 Native American land claims, 65 prisoner uprisings,66 environ-
mental controversies, 67 and public policy disputes.68
Some ADR programs may fall under one paradigm, but operate more like
another. For instance, important ADR efforts that are structured as a legal
ADR model might operate like a Social ADR program because of the enor-
mous latitude contained in the statutory guidelines. While negotiated settle-
ments between parents and children accused of status offenses must receive
court approval, there are almost no constraints upon what parties can agree to
in resolving their problem. On the other hand, although restitution programs
using negotiations are modeled along the legal ADR paradigm, participants
operate much closer in spirit and practice to the Institutional ADR model. The
paradigms are useful, however, in highlighting the range of freedom granted
to the negotiators. This range indicates confidence in and fidelity to the negoti-
ation process and its goals.
For each ADR paradigm, ADR advocates propose that intervenors assist
negotiating parties reach a consensual agreement. Although the term "media-
tor" is often used to describe the intervenor, the outcomes the intervenor tries
to facilitate and, derivatively, his or her options, strategies, and obligations,
differ importantly among the potentially governing paradigms in which the
intervenor is operating.
63. Stulberg, Negotiation Concepts and Advocacy Skills, 48 ALB. L. REV. 719,
735 (1984).
64. COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 18-19.
65. Joint statement by Secretary Cuomo and Kakirakeron released May 13,
1977 announcing mediated settlement of negotiations involving occupation of 600-acre
campsite at Moss Lake in Adirondack State Park. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1977, 22, col.
1; Wash. Post. May 14, 1977, A6, col. 1.
66. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT OF
THE AM.ARB.A. (1973).
67. DRAFT GUIDELINES TO IDENTIFY, MANAGE AND RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTES, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR (1978).
68. Susskind, supra note 2.
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Correlative to the ADR paradigms discussed above are the prototype in-
tervenor postures of compliance officer, manager, and developer.
ADR Paradigm Institutional Legal Social
ADR ADR ADR
Intervenor Compliance Manager Developer
Role Officer
The respective intervenor obligations of office are analyzed below.
A. Intervenor As Compliance Officer
Some intervenors help secure consensual agreements only if those specific
commitments are compatible with organizational policy. The intervenor is ob-
ligated to veto agreements which violate those norms, or settlement discussions
which mention violating them. The mediator must veto such subjects; the wis-
dom or utility of the pertinent policies and practices can be debated and
changed at other levels or at other times.
Ombudsperson programs"" and corporate ADR projects7" clearly define
such a role for the intervenor or counselor. The intervenor represents the insti-
tution. His or her loyalty is to it and intervenors encourage consensual deci-
sions only insofar as they comply with its policies and practices. Consider the
trivial case of a corporate dress code. A subordinate refuses to wear white
shirts as required. His supervisor disciplines him and the subordinate appeals
to an employee counselor to review the penalty. Clearly, the dress code policy
requiring the white shirt is not subject to discussion; the counselor focuses only
on the propriety of the discipline. Indeed, if the supervisor agreed not to en-
force the code for the subordinate, other employees might complain about the
lack of consistent treatment. Then, the counselor's duty would be to persuade
the supervisor to act in compliance with the governing rule.
To be effective, this intervenor must be objective, articulate, and a person
of integrity whom people feel confident in entrusting with their private em-
barassments or vehement protestations. Those traits are common with the
other intervenor postures. However, part of this job is to persuade persons to
agree, accept, and comply with certain institutional rules to which the inter-
venor must be faithful. In some contexts, that posture positively forecloses con-
sensual decision-making and intervenor neutrality.
This is the most restricted of the ADR models in terms of what the par-
ties are at liberty to decide and, concomitantly, what an intervenor can permit
them to decide. If subject matter constraints severely deprive the parties of the
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freedom to negotiate anything of significance, the program has made consen-
sual decision-making a sham and the intervenor's role is simply that of a re-
viewing officer whose job is to insure that conduct conforms to accepted prac-
tices. Under the best of circumstances, the parties, including the intervenor,
are not at liberty to establish a set of priorities among the rules that differ
from those established by the institution. A supervisor cannot agree to let one
employee work at whatever time he or she wants while requiring a fixed time
schedule for everyone else doing comparable work, even if that is acceptable to
the supervisor. Individuals in other contexts, however, have greater freedom to
negotiate settlement terms according to their own schedule of priorities.
B. Intervenor as Manager
The intervenor's job in the Legal ADR model is to promote an agreement
acceptable to the parties so long as all of its terms are legal. The intervenor, if
he or she is to remain faithful to the paradigm that promotes consensual deci-
sion-making, 7 assumes the obligation to press persons to consider a range of
settlement options that they find acceptable even if those solutions do not re-
flect the intervenor's personal preferences or those of the general public.
7
1
Since the parties' have the opportunity to establish both legal and non-legal
priorities according to their own assessment of their needs and interests, the
intervenor's obligation, unlike that of the compliance officer, is to manage the
review. Unlike the developer's role, however, the manager must honor a
party's claim to insist upon a particular legal rule or principle rendering cer-
tain options ineligible for discussion.
The Wagner Act, for example, has been interpreted to establish a range
of mandatory bargaining subjects for employer and union representatives;73 if
either party presents a proposal addressing one of these topics, the other can-
not ignore it, though it need not accept it.7 4 Once the issue is raised, failure to
address it constitutes the commission of an unfair labor practice.7 5 For non-
mandatory bargaining subjects, such mutuality is discretionary only.7 6 If the
employer does not want to discuss the subject of education tuition benefits, for
example, he need not do so; and it the union were to press for its discussion, it
could be charged with a statutory violation. 77 If the employer refuses to dis-
cuss it, then the intervenor who is trying to facilitate discussion toward an
agreement might press the employer to reconsider his position in the interest
of obtaining a settlement, satisfying the work force, or some other reason. But
were the employer to persist in his refusal, the intervenor's responsibility is
71. Newman, supra note 2.
72. Id.
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clear; enforce the law by trying to get the union to drop consideration of its
non-mandatory bargaining issue. The intervenor, in an effort to preserve his or
her neutrality, might wrap such moves in the rhetoric of, "I don't favor the
law or oppose it. But I must uphold it." That move fools no one. There can be
no pretense that the mediator can be neutral on the issue of whether the mat-
ter can be discussed; the intervenor is obliged to enforce the subject matter
jurisdictional restraints established by other bodies. 78
To assert that an agreement must be legal leaves considerable latitude for
the parties to resolve the matter in a way acceptable to them. A landlord, for
example, can waive his right to collect the full amount due in rent arrearages
in exchange for the tenant's commitment to pay some lesser amount in cash
and vacate the premise promptly. Court personnel encourage parties to negoti-
ate settlements rather than proceed with a trial or appellate argument.7 9 In-
deed, most ADR programs involving mediated negotiations prescribe this role
for the intervenor.80
We can now analyze more sharply the OCA regulation of mediator con-
duct in spousal and child abuse cases. 81 Program regulators have established a
subject matter limitation for all programs which require individual program
personnel to improve their screening efforts to detect abuse cases and prevent
them from being scheduled for a mediation session. When addressing the me-
diator's responsibility in those cases that bypass the screening process and
reach mediation, program regulators have conflated two intervenor models into
one. The policy not only requires the mediator to prevent the parties from
consummating such obviously illegal agreements as "fighting is permitted only
three times per week," but also requires the intervenor to assert affirmatively
to the accused perpetrator that his conduct is objectionable and furnish
whatever assistance possible to the victim. This converts the intervenor's pos-
ture from that of a manager to that of compliance officer. The more consistent
posture for the intervenor in such programs would be to exercise one of two
options: close the hearing on the principle that an exempt subject matter im-
properly passed the screening mechanism or let the parties continue to try to
reach an agreement that is legal and durable, but if impasse for any reason is
reached, close the hearing.
The intervenor operating as a manager, however, is not effective when
trying to resolve controversies involving parties who do not recognize or accept
78. E. ROBINS, A GUIDE FOR LABOR MEDIATORS 7 (1976) makes this point
although frequently the rhetoric among labor mediators is that they can and must re-
main completely neutral; see J. TENER, MEDIATION SKILLS IN CREATIVE APPROACHES
TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 65 (1982).
79. E. KNIGHT, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION-A GOING CONCERN IN CALI-
FORNIA IN CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1982; J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P.
SZANTON, supra note 52, at 31.
80. See supra note 6.
81. See supra note 7.
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as binding the legal jurisdiction or laws operative in the United States judicial
system. Some types of Native American land claim controversies are of such a
nature.82 Nor is this intervention posture useful in resolving controversies in
which one or more of the parties is openly using legal actions to enjoin conduct
while simultaneously mobilizing efforts to change the law that otherwise con-
trols the negotiating process. Environmental controversies exemplify this type
of dispute.83 What is an intervenor's role in such contexts?
C. Intervenor as Developer
It is commonplace to observe that customs, practices, and values change
over time. Persons can prompt change as well as adjust to it, and mediated
negotiations can be an instrument for making change.
The basic premise of the Social ADR model is that no conventional rule
is immutable. Nothing is ineligible for discussion. No rule exists that imposes
mandatory standards for certifying the acceptability of settlement terms. This
does not mean that everything, practically speaking, is possible. It means that
reality is simply a troublesome practical challenge to address, rather than an
impenetrable legal or conceptual constraint. Negotiators might believe-or be
persuaded to believe-that it is fruitful to discuss settlement terms of issues
even if implementing the agreed upon terms would require additional collabo-
ration and efforts. One party's insistence that certain legal rights be honored
does not compel compliance or foreclose discussion of changing what each
party might be legally entitled or obligated to do. For instance, school officials
might negotiate with parent groups regarding changes in classroom supervision
procedures, even if implementing such an agreement required additional col-
laboration and consent from the teacher's union."
Although the parties are not obligated to have their settlement terms con-
form to any prescribed criteria, the intervenor's job need not become compara-
bly fluid. Some argue that the intervenor should be an aggressive advocate
who insists that parties attach greater weight to the criteria he or she singles
out.85 Fisher, Ury and their adherents argue that negotiators should be evalu-
ated based on the wisdom of the wisdom of the agreement reached86 and the
extent to which nonparticipant interests are protected by the terms of the
agreement.8" They claim that the intervenor's job is to advocate and insure
such an outcome8 8 (hereafter referred to as advocate intervenor). Others pro-
pose that any agreement among disputants is better than no agreement at
82. See supra note 65.
83. See supra note 59.
84. See COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, supra note 64, at 13 for a discussion
of similiar disputes.
85. Susskind & Ozawa, supra note 2, at 263.
86. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 19, at 4.
87. Id.
88. Susskind & Ozawa, supra note 2, at 263.
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all;89 parties' preferences should be decisive and the intervenor is obligated to
support that standard.90 The nature of any particular controversy does not
foreclose either intervenor posture. There is, however, a decisive reason for
rejecting the advocate intervenor posture: it betrays the assumed commitment
to promoting consensual decision-making by converting democratic decision-
making into a hierarchical, authoritarian, dispute-settlement mechanism.
Advocate intervenors defend their proposed intervention posture by two
methods: (1) requiring the parties to agree on criteria that will govern the
decision-making before they discuss their substantive issues91 or (2) announc-
ing criteria the intervenor will insist that the parties adhere to as a condition
of service.92 Neither response is successful.
First, gaining agreement on the criteria against which proposed settle-
ment terms are accepted or rejected simply relocates, rather than answers, the
critical question. What should the intervenor's obligation be if the parties can
agree to a set of criteria to guide their discussion but the mediator disapproves
of their criteria? Second, even assuming that the negotiating parties agree to
adopt the very criteria that the mediator endorses, there can be a subsequent
controversy as to whether the proposed settlement terms are consistent with
those criteria. What is the intervenor's duty if the disputing parties reach
terms of agreement they believe to be consistent with the criteria, but the
intervenor disagrees? If the parties agree in advance to accept the intervenor's
determination, the controversy would dissolve; however, the parties are no
longer engaged in consensual decision-making. Rather, they are participating
in a hierarchical process in which approval for terms of settlement rests with a
pre-established authoritative source-the intervenor is now the compliance
officer.
The advocate intervenor posture highlights the intervenor's values but at-
tempts, inappropriately, to make them decisive. To reject that stance does not
mean that the intervenor has no values nor that the intervenor can mysteri-
ously "leave his or her values outside the negotiating room."913 It simply under-
scores the need for the intervenor to focus sharply and constantly on the mat-
ter of whose beliefs should dominate the resolution of which issues.
Conventional mediators hold that the intervenor should let the parties'
preferences dominate. 94 The intervenor's job is to persuade, cajole, and press
89. Newman, supra note 1.
90. Id.
91. Susskind & Ozawa, supra note 2, at 267.
92. Id.
93. This type of rhetoric is routinely given by trainers to persons being trained
to serve as mediators for community dispute resolution programs in order to emphasize
the importance of giving priority to the parties' preferences. Substantively, however, it
is not accurate.
94. Newman, supra note 1; E. ROBINS, supra note 78.
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parties to reach settlement." One must not underestimate or neglect the influ-
ence that individual intervenors exert over various participants by discharging
those duties. Can the intervenor discharge these functions without adopting
some version of the advocate intervenor's posture? Though subtle and elusive,
the reasons that guide an intervenor's conduct establish the affirmative answer.
Presume that a group of employees submit a wage demand that the employer
could pay comfortably but resists doing so. The intervenor might exert tremen-
dous energy and personal charisma in an attempt to get the employer to pay
more than his stated position rather than using that same energy to get the
employees to accept the employer's last offer. That does not necessarily mean
that the intervenor is not neutral. If the intervenor's assessment is that the
employees will not accept anything less than their stated demand and will en-
gage in some job action to obtain it, then the reason the intervenor might press
the employer for movement is not that he or she believes that the employer
should pay more or that the employees are entitled to that raise, but rather
because he or she believes that the employer would opt for granting the wage
demand when confronted with the costs attached to not settling.
One does not have to claim that an intervenor must have no values to be
neutral in the sense required to promote consensual decision-making. Two dis-
tinctions must be made. First, an individual holds a variety of val-
ues-political, social, religious, aesthetic, educational, and moral. Second,
each person prioritizes those values. It is conceivable that an intervenor can
promote consensual decision-making even if some of the intervenor's values
conflict with those of the participants. What must be examined is which values
are in conflict and what priority the intervenor attaches to them. Assume par-
ents demand that school officials discontinue the high school football program
and spend those monies to purchase microcomputers for classroom use. While
an intervenor might have personal preferences with regard to how the specific
item should be resolved, he might also acknowledge that he is not in the best
position to know what priority the school system attaches to parental partici-
pation and support as contrasted with maintaining the football program. Then,
he could comfortably adopt the posture that his task is to assist them reach an
agreement they find acceptable in its various dimensions. But a genuine con-
flict of fundamental values can arise. For example, if parents and school offi-
cials adopted policies that knowingly perpetuated racially discriminatory treat-
ment of students, an intervenor might be much less inclined to grant decisive
weight to their preferences. Then, given the governing commitment to promote
consensual decision-making, the intervenor's responsibility is to withdraw from
the discussion rather than attempt to impose his judgment on the parties in
that forum. 6
Intervenors face such conflicts regularly. Should an intervenor prevent
parties from agreeing to settlement terms that the intervenor believes are less
95. Id.
96. Stulberg, supra note 32, at 116.
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favorable to one party than he would have obtained under the law? 97 Should
the intervenor let parties agree to unfavorable settlement terms out of igno-
rance and impatience rather than with informed consent? 98 Should an inter-
venor either block an agreement that was practically dictated by the more
powerful participant or affirmatively deploy tactics to realign the power imbal-
ance before the negotiations can conclude?" While these are unsettling exper-
iences for the intervenor, the obligation is straightforward: if the parties have
agreed to reach a decision through negotiations (and, in the flexible Legal
ADR paradigm are jurisdictionally permitted to do so), then the intervenor
should honor their preferences unless the results would violate the intervenor's
more fundamental values, in which case the person should withdraw. Obvi-
ously, different persons serving as intervenors will make different judgments
regarding what they consider to be fundamental concerns. Each individual
should predicate his or her service as an intervenor in light of that assessment.
There are practical consequences of this commitment. If the intervenor
services a range of conflicts in which the issues and potential solutions conflict
frequently with positions he or she values highly, then his or her usefulness in
serving as an intervenor is drastically diminished. If such occasions occur only
infrequently, then no one experiences serious inconvenience."' 0 No one, of
course, need apologize for adhering to positions and principles that generate
such conflict; all one must do is acknowledge that such beliefs and positions
might functionally disqualify him from effectively executing an intervenor's
role-a role that carries a primary commitment to promoting consensual deci-
sion-making by others.10 1
It is in this context that intervenors admonish one another to be neutral
vis-i-vis the parties and the terms on which they settle. The assumption is that
the answer to the first defining question that queried if negotiation was a valu-
able enterprise is affirmative. To the degree that an intervenor's scheme of
values and priorities dovetails with those of the parties and the matters they
are trying to resolve, then the intervenor's potential usefulness for facilitating
the negotiation is enormously enhanced. 02 In this very important sense, partic-
97. See supra note 9.
98. J. Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alternative, in ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 26 (1982).
99. Susskind & Ozawa, supra note 2, at 268-69.
100. Most individuals serving as mediators in community dispute resolution cen-
ters do not feel constrained from remaining neutral in most of the disputes that the
centers service. Were it otherwise, programs dependent upon volunteer mediators could
not operate effectively.
101. This is simply a different way of examining whether one's interests and as-
pirations propel him or her to adopt visible advocacy roles in various community and
civic matters; no one is suggesting that one should not do that nor that the mediator's
role is in any way more valuable than the advocate's function.
102. It is in this very important sense that who the people are who are involved
in the controversy as advocates and mediators makes a decisive difference in how it will
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ularly in the Social ADR context, the individuals who are involved as partici-
pants and intervenors are critical to the ultimate success of the undertaking.
Progress towards agreement can be retarded or thwarted not by a substantive
disagreement among the parties but by friction among the intervenor and
parties.
Intervenors, like the advocates, make value judgments. It is inescapable.
That does not mean, as some argue, that the intervenor can no longer be neu-
tral in any meaningful sense.' An intervenor can assist parties resolve a host
of practical daily problems without feeling that various resolutions conflict
with the dictates of his or her fundamental critical morality. An intervenor
can anchor his or her service on the commitment to make the parties take
seriously their own commitment to engage in consensual decision-making. Al-
though that leaves ample space for parties and intervenors to disagree on the
specifics, it weds all of them to accepting the right of an individual or group to
develop its preferred style of life based upon a showing of equal respect and
dignity.
V. CONCLUSION
Negotiation is not a rights-based dispute resolution procedure. Rather, it
is a process for creating new or revised relationships of rights and obligations
which requires persons to assume responsibility for shaping the events that
affect their interests.
A variety of ADR programs endorse this procedure. Furthermore, they
share a commitment to insuring its operative effectiveness by designing inter-
venor roles as support systems. This common commitment, however, masks the
distinctive purposes and the resulting roles and responsibilities that each ADR
program prescribes for the various participants. Each differs fundamentally on
the choice of the standards applicable for guiding and measuring the accepta-
bility of negotiated outcomes. In many institutional-based procedures, the
standards or policies are detailed and pervasive. ADR efforts do not supplant
those policies, but serve primarily as oversight mechanisms that simultane-
ously encourage persons to conciliate their differences while demanding that
the outcomes be consistent with established institutional procedures. The inter-
venor's role is similarly defined and restricted to promoting such outcomes.
Legal-based ADR programs, though varying considerably in terms of the
range of possible outcomes the parties can develop, ground the allegiance of
the parties and intervenor to standards that have been properly promulgated
and made public. This necessarily restricts the range of matters on which the
intervenor can officially choose to remain neutral. In publicly funded ADR
programs or systems serving substantial numbers of people,' debate and dis-
be resolved.
103. Susskind & Ozawa, supra note 2, at 269.
104. See supra notes 6 and 7.
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INTERVENOR VALUES
cussion regarding what subject matters should be placed within the forum of
consensual decision-making is appropriate and, hopefully, spirited. Once they
have been established, participant support of the answers, as well as their ex-
emptions, is obligatory.
Social ADR efforts encompass those disputes in which the parties are not
bound by independently prescribed standards of judgment. This does not mean
that no standards are appropriate; it simply means that persons can offer dif-
fering conceptions as to what rational persons should do in those particular
circumstances. Even if these standards are non-articulated, the intervenor ines-
capably has a personal conception of appropriate standards for judgment.
Given that no outside standards automatically pre-empt his standards from
being the controlling ones, the question arises as to his or her proper interven-
tion posture. The controlling consideration is that the intervenor is a catalyst
for promoting consensual decision-making by the parties. While not denying
that the intervenor can exert considerable influence over the outcome. His or
her primary obligation is to facilitate agreement according to the standards
acceptable to the disputants, while not camouflaging the considerable influence
the intervenor can exert over the outcome. Different intervenors make different
personal judgments as to which of their beliefs and values they are willing to
subordinate to the preferences of others. These differences simply reflect the
different standards to which each person gives allegiance and which shape our
individual lifestyles. Persons might dispute the propriety of someone agreeing
to serve in a particular dispute. For instance, some might argue that a person
who agrees to intervene in discussions between the Klu Klux Klan and local
government officials about safety measures for a public parade is thereby en-
dorsing' 05 the Klan's legitimacy and, therefore, should not agree to serve as
intervenor. Others might argue that serving in such a situation minimizes the
potential for unnecessary acts of violence and that promoting that goal over-
rides other values. Such disagreements are healthy and sharpen our insights
into those fundamental political and moral values that command our alle-
giance and the manner in which they should be applied to resolve contempo-
rary social challenges. Such disagreements should not, however, lead to the
conclusion that in those instances in which the parties' preferences conflict
with those of the intervenor, the intervenor should convert his or her role from
that of facilitating consensus decision-making to that of demanding compli-
ance to specific rules of conduct. It should generate, instead, a searching in-
quiry about what procedures a democratic society should use in resolving both
the relatively trivial as well as the most pressing social conflicts of our times.
105. COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, supra note 64, at 17.
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